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A Primer on Monetary Policy
Part I: Goals and Instruments
Recent interest rate increases have focused the
public's attention on the conduct of monetary
policy and the role ofthe Federal Reserve. In
February, the Fed's policymaking body, the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC), raised
the federal funds rate a quarter of a percentage
point, the first such increase since 1989. The
FOMC voted again for two more 25 basis point
increases in March and April, and at the May
17th meeting the federal funds rate was pushed
up another half a percentage point.
These actions were designed to prevent inflation
from rising above its current annual rate of under
3 percent. The interest rate hikes were consistent
with the Fed's desire to move the economy grad-
ually towards even lower rates of inflation in
order to achieve price stability. Because these
actions occurred before any actual increase in
inflation, the FOMC's policy has generated wide
debate among economists and in the popular
press.
In order to grasp the issues at the heart ofthe re-
cent debates, it is helpful to understand some of
the elements involved in setting monetary policy.
This Weekly Letter provides the first of a two-part
primer designed to give an overview of issues in
how monetary policy is conducted. Part one re-
views the goals of monetary policy and the basic
instruments the Fed can use to conduct policy.
The next Weekly Letter will discuss the role of in-
termediate targets, indicators, rules and forecasts
in the implementation of monetary policy.
The goals of monetary policy
In the lobby ofthe Federal Reserve Bank'of San
Francisco, visitors are exposed to the difficulties
of implementing monetary policy through an
electronic video game. The object is to time the
release of a dart from a moving arm in order to
hit the bull's-eye of a moving target. The moving
bull's-eye reflects, in a graphic manner, the un-
certainty that exists over the appropriate goals
of monetary policy, and the changing values of
these goals as a result of developments both in
the economy and in our understanding ofthe
economy.
The "official" goals of monetary policy, en-
shrined in the Federal Reserve Act (Section
2A(1)), are to "promote ... maximum employ-
ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates:' If maximum employment is inter-
preted as that level of employment consistent
with the numerical goal of 4 percent unemploy-
ment established by the Humphrey-Hawkins
"Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978;' then few economists believe it is possible
to achieve all these goals at once in the U.S.
economy.
The belief that 4 percent unemployment and
stable prices are inconsistent is shaped by the
widely accepted "natural rate hypothesis." It
argues that the economy's average equilibrium
unemployment rate, often called the natural rate
of unemployment, is independent of monetary
policy. Most current estimates ofthe natural rate
place it in the range of 6 to 6Y2 percent. Taken
together, these imply that the unemployment rate
will tend to average around the 6 to 6Y2 percent
range in the long run, regardless ofthe conduct
of monetary policy.
What if the Federal Reserve tried to achieve 4
percent unemployment in the long run? Consis-
tent attempts to expand the economy beyond its
potential for production will result in higher in-
flation while ultimately failing to produce lower
average unemployment. In fact; extreme rates of
inflation (or deflation) may so dis'rupt the role
of the price system in directing resources in a
market economy that the result could be slower
average growth and higher average unemploy-
ment. Although economists continue to debate
whether reducing inflation from moderate to low
rates would significantly improve the long-run
performance ofthe economy, most believe that
there are no long-term gains from consistently
pursuing expansionary policies.
While the Fed has little effect on the natural
rate of unemployment, the Fed can determine the
economy's average rate of inflation. Thus, many
recent commentators have emphasized the need
to define the goals of monetary policy in termsFRBSF
of low or zero inflation, which is achievable.
In 1989, Representative Neal (D, NC) actually
introduced a bill in Congress that would have
amended the Federal Reserve Act to make price
stability the sole goal of u.s. monetary policy.
The idea that central banks should have goals
defined only in terms of price stability or low
inflation is not new. John Maynard Keynes wrote
in 1924 that " . .. they (Treasury and Bank of Eng-
land) should adopt the stability of sterling prices
as their primary objective" (p. 202).
In practice, the Fed, like most central banks,
cares about both inflation and measures of the
short-run cyclical performance of the economy.
However, pursuing multiple goals can create
conflicts for policy; for example, the desire to
mitigate short-run downturns raises the issue of
whether this goal should take precedence over a
low-inflation goal at any particular point in time.
Thus, it isimportant to avoid allowing short-run,
temporary successes in preventing employment
losses during recessions from leading to longer-
run failures in maintaining low inflation. Propo-
nents of more activist policy argue, however, that
monetary policycan helpto stabilize the economy
and should act to offset temporary downturns in
economic activity. They argue that responding to
temporar~ cyclical fluctuations need not be in-
consistent with maintaining a firm commitment
to low average inflation.
One effect of having multiple, conflicting goals
is that it leads to political pressures on the Fed,
varying in strength and intensity over time, for
lower interest rates, for faster growth, or for lower
inflation. Political pressure on monetary policy is
usually criticized for its tendency to emphasize
short-run considerations over longer-run objec-
tives. For example, politicians who may have time
horizons that extend only to the next election will
be tempted to push for more expansionary polic~
which may produce lower unemployment and
faster real growth in the short run, even though in
the long run it can only lead to higher inflation.
Unless the central bank has sufficient independ-
ence from political institutions to resist such
pressures, the result is likely to be higher average
inflation with no appreciable effect on average un-
employmentorreal growth. Alesina and Summers
(1993) find that greater central bank independ-
ence is associated with lower average inflation,
but they find no association with average real
growth among the industrialized economies.
In sum, monetary policy is continually faced
with a conflict between what it can temporarily
achieve in the short run and what it can perma-
nently achieve in the longer run. That is why
even those economists who believe monetary
policy has an important role to play in helping
to stabilize short-run business cycle fluctuations
also have, in recent years, increasingly empha-
.sized the importance of maintaining a commit-
ment to low average rates of inflation.
The instruments of monetary policy
The Fed does not control inflation or unemploy-
ment directly; instead, the Fed must decide on
the settings for the tools, or instruments, of pol-
icy that it does control directly as it attempts to
achieve its objectives of low inflation and stable
economic growth. It is predominantly through
open market operations-purchases and sales of
government securities-that the Fed attempts to
influence the economy and achieve its policy
goals. Open market operations influence the
level of bank reserves in the econom~ which in
turn influences the level of interest rates, the pro-
vision of money and credit, investment spending,
and the pace of economic activity.
Banks are legally required to hold a fraction of
certain types of deposit accounts that they issue
as reserves. They keep these reserves in the form
of vault cash or deposits with the Fed. When
banks need additional reserves on a short-term
basis, they can borrow them from other banks
who happen to have more reserves than they
need. The interest rate on the overnight borrow-
ing of reserves is called the federal funds rate.
The funds rate adjusts to balance the supply and
demand for reserves.
Open market operations affect the supply of re-
serves in the banking system. Ifthe Fed buys
government securities, it pays for them by adding
reserves to the banking system; this increases the
supply of reserves, which lowers the cost of bor-
rowing reserves-the federal funds rate falls.
When the Fed sells government securities, the
reverse happens: the supply of reserves falls,
and the federal funds rate rises.
Ifthe demand for reserves were perfectly predict-
able, the Fed could predict exactly the relation-
ship between the quantity of reserves and the
funds rate. In this case, it could use either re-
serves or the funds rate as its policy instrumentequally well. But, because reserve demand can
fluctuate unpredictably, the choice between the
use of a quantity and the use of an interest rate
as the chief instrument of policy does make a
difference. To see why, suppose the economy
grows faster than predicted, putting upward pres-
sure on interest rates as credit demand increases.
If the Fed tries to control the quantity of reserves,
it will not accommodate the greater demand for
credit, and the funds rate will rise. This will tend
to push up other interest rates and act as an auto-
matic brake on the economy. Ifthe Fed is using-
the funds rate as its instrument, this pressure for
higher interest rates will automatically produce a
rise in the supply of reserves as the Fed acts to
prevent the funds rate from rising. In this exam-
ple, policy that focuses on the quantity of re-
serves would be less likely to let inflation rise.
If, in contrast, pressures for higher interest rates
came from a financial market development, such
as tighter regulatory supervision of bank lending
practices, a policy that acted to keep the quantity
of reserves constant would lead some key lend-
ing rates to rise, which would tend to have a
contractionary effect on the economy. If policy
acted to keep the funds rate constant, then the
supply of reserves would automatically increase
to offset the contractionary effect ofthe financial
disturbance. During most ofthe post-war era, the
interest rate approach to implementing policy-
setting the level of the funds rate-provides a
more accurate description of Fed operating
procedures.
The link between open market activities and
the federal funds rates is fairly straightforward.
The other linkages between policy actions and
the behavior of the economy are subject to more
controversy. The roles played by intermediate tar-
gets, forecasts and policy rules in linking policy
actions with the behavior ofthe economy will be
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in june, july, August, and December.